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JOINT PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON
SOVIET INTENTIONS AND ACTIVITIES

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No Change in Class. ☐

☐ Declassified

Class. Changed to: TS S

Next Review Date:

Ref: HR 70-3

Date: 27 FEB 1979

By

From: 24 August 1950
To : 30 August 1950
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
Washington 25, D. C.
31 August 1950

No. 4

JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

1. SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD

- a. The Soviet Union is in an advanced stage of preparation for war and could initiate offensive operations with no additional warning. Reliable intelligence on Soviet intentions to go to war in the near future is lacking.
- b. There are no firm indications of Soviet intentions in Korea. There are indications of an air and ground build-up by Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria but there are no indications as to whether they are intended for offensive or defensive purposes.
- c. There are no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa. Although weather conditions will not be favorable for an attack after mid-September, an attack after that date is possible.
- d. There are continuing indications of increasing preparedness of Soviet and Satellite forces in Europe, but no recent unusual troop activity has been reported.

2. SOVIET-COMMUNIST OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD

- a. Summary.--There are indications of the movement of elements of the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army to Manchuria and there are reports of increased Chinese Communist ground and air activity on the North Korean border. The Chinese Communists have alleged that U. S. bombers attacked Manchurian cities and have demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Formosa. There are no new indications of a Chinese Communist attack on Tibet. There are no current indications of Soviet troop movement in Europe, but airfield preparations and logistical build-up continue.
- b. Operations of enemy component elements.

- (1) KOREA.--See current situation reports. Cumulative information continues to indicate preparations for the reconstitution of a North Korean air arm.

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- (2) CHINA.--Elements of the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army have moved to Manchuria during recent weeks. The Chinese Communists are reportedly increasing their ground and air activity on the Manchurian-North Korean border. This activity, together with Chinese Communist charges of U.S. attacks on their territory, could be a preliminary to intervention in the Korean conflict, but there are no firm indications of Chinese Communist intentions. Available information does not indicate an imminent attack on Formosa.
 - (3) INDO-CHINA.--There are further indications of Chinese Communist training and re-equipping of the Viet Minh, apparently as a long-term program. A Viet Minh offensive and increased guerrilla operations in Laos and Cambodia are possible in the near future.
 - (4) TIBET.--The Chinese Communists are apparently continuing efforts to secure control of Tibet by negotiation; an invasion is still possible although it does not appear to have begun.
 - (5) EUROPE.--There are no indications of unusual recent troop activity. The Soviets are transferring some equipment and personnel from Austria to Hungary. The re-equipping of Soviet air units in Hungary with jet fighters has begun. There are further fragmentary indications of increased petroleum stockpiles in Europe. There have been sizeable shipments of Soviet military equipment to the Balkans during the past few months.
 - (6) NEAR EAST.--The U.S.S.R. has continued its conciliatory gestures towards Iran with the apparent intention of increasing Soviet influence in the border provinces. There are no reliable indications of imminent Kurdish uprisings in the Near East.
3. See Tab "A" attached.
4. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES.--Chinese Communist capabilities for intervention in Korea from Manchuria are evidently increasing. Soviet and Communist capabilities in Europe remain essentially unchanged but capabilities for surprise attack have increased over the past several months.

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TAB "A"

ESTIMATE OF SOVIET INTENTIONS TO GO TO WAR IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

Proceedings of the Joint Intelligence Indications Committee
30 August 19501. Soviet Intentions in the Far East.

a. Recent Chinese Communist statements and reports of military activity in Manchuria have raised the question of whether the Chinese Communists are preparing for military intervention in the Korean conflict. The following constitutes the intelligence available at present with respect to Chinese Communist capabilities and preparations for such action.

- (1) Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria are estimated to include 400,000 military district troops (provincial forces) among whom are 70,000 Koreans with experience in the Chinese Communist Forces. There are also an estimated 165,000 former Nationalist soldiers in Manchuria.
- (2) Since the fall of Hainan to the Chinese Communists, there have been reliable reports of the movement of large elements of the Chinese Communist Fourth Field Army northward from the Canton area but the ultimate destination of the bulk of this Army is not known. There are indications of the movements of elements of the Fourth Field Army north of the Yellow River, apparently to Manchuria. The identity of the units and the size of the movement are unknown, except that it is possible that the 40th Army, with an estimated strength of 22,000, was included in the movement. There are no firm indications of the presence in Manchuria of a substantial portion of the Fourth Field Army. The Fourth Field Army originally came from Manchuria.
- (3) There are indications of a build-up of Chinese Communist forces on the Manchurian-North Korean border (Yalu River), particularly in the area of Antung, and of preparations of defenses in the area. Although the presence of elements of the Fourth Field Army in this area has been reported, there are no firm identifications of the troops. A reinforcement of the North Korean border could be composed of military district troops or Koreans from Manchuria. The build-up of Chinese Communist defenses on the border would be a logical security development in view of the Korean conflict.

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- (4) There are indications of increased air activity at Antung, including reports of the arrival of fighters and medium bombers. It has also been alleged that Antung is the main base of the North Korean Air Force; this would be a logical security precaution against U. S. bombing although it is not confirmed. There are three airfields in the Antung area whose combined facilities could handle 300 aircraft. On 24 August, a U. S. reconnaissance plane on a mission near, but not over, the Manchurian border received anti-aircraft fire, some of which was estimated to have come from across the Yalu River near Antung.
- (5) There are no indications of the movement of Chinese Communist units into Korea, nor are there indications that the North Korean forces have been reinforced by substantial numbers of Koreans from Manchuria.
- (6) In an official protest of 27 August, the Chinese Communist Government charged that U. S. bombers had strafed and bombed three Chinese cities and Antung airfield on the Manchurian side of the Yalu River. The protest stated that the U.S. should bear all responsibilities and consequences for these acts, demanded compensation, and reserved the right of raising further demands with regard to the provocative acts of U. S. aggressive forces in Korea. This protest was possibly intended as a justification for future Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.

b. Cumulative evidence of the past two weeks strongly indicates preparations for the reconstitution of a North Korean air arm. Photo reconnaissance has shown rapid construction of new aircraft revetments and repair of old revetments at several fields in Korea. As indicated above, additional aircraft reported at Antung, Manchuria, may be consigned to the North Koreans.

c. Available information continues to show no indications of an imminent attack on Formosa. In a communication to the United Nations, Chinese Communist Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai stated that the movement of the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Formosa Strait and the arrival of contingents of the U.S. Air Force in Formosa constituted direct armed aggression on Chinese territory. He reiterated the intent of the Chinese Communists to liberate Formosa and all other territories belonging to China, and called on the UN to condemn the United States and to take immediate measures to bring about the complete withdrawal of all U.S. armed forces from Formosa. According to a recent unconfirmed report the Chinese Communists have shown reluctance to undertake an invasion of Formosa despite Russian insistence, and the decision was said to have been postponed for a further Sino-Soviet military conference. High-ranking Chinese Communist Army officers are reported to have left Peiping on 16 August for a military conference in the U.S.S.R.

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d. Further evidence of Chinese Communist assistance to the Viet Minh has been received. About 15,000 - 17,000 Viet Minh are now believed to be in training camps in Yunnan or Kwangsi or in transit between these camps and Tonkin. These trainees are replaced at regular intervals by other groups which receive new materiel in the training area. Artillery, tank, and ground aviation training and other long-term projects indicate that a modernization of the Viet Minh armed forces on the North Korean pattern may be in progress. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The existence of some such agreement is probable. Guerilla movements in Laos and Cambodia appear to have been revitalized and absorbed by the Viet Minh, and a resurgence of rebel activity in these states can probably be expected at an early date. This conceivably could be followed by the establishment of "people's republics" with subsequent recognition by the U.S.S.R. and the Communist bloc, a development which would further extend and weaken French forces. A report of the presence of 150 Soviet type aircraft on airfields in Yunnan is not supported by available evidence. There are a number of airfields in the area, however, and three are capable of supporting medium bombers.

e. There is no further information on the dispositions of Chinese Communist forces for an attack on Tibet, and reports that the attack has begun appear to be unfounded. Indian discussions with the Chinese Communists on the question have led the former to believe that the Chinese do not contemplate an immediate attack but that the Chinese will insist on the setting up of a Communist regime in Lhasa, by negotiation if possible. The high passes into Tibet will be blocked by snow in early autumn.

f. The dispatch of a Burmese Ambassador to Moscow and the arrival in Burma of a Chinese Communist diplomatic mission will undoubtedly result in increased Communist pressure on the pro-Soviet elements in the Socialist Party and the Burmese Government. There is no indication, however, of a change in the official government policy of neutrality.

g. From the foregoing, it concluded that:

- (1) There are indications of an air and ground build-up by Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria, but there are no indications as yet as to how these forces will be used or whether they are for offensive or defensive purposes.
- (2) There are continuing indications of preparations for increased air operations by the North Korean forces.
- (3) Available information does not indicate an imminent attack on Formosa.

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(4) Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh indicates a pattern of long-term modernization of Viet Minh forces, but a Viet Minh offensive and intensified guerrilla activities in Laos and Cambodia are possibilities in the near future.

(5) A Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet is still possible but the Chinese are apparently also continuing efforts to secure control of Tibet by negotiation.

2. Soviet Intentions in Europe and the Near East.

a. There have been no reports of unusual troop movements by Soviet or Eastern European forces. Some Bulgarian units which were on the Yugoslav border are reported to be returning to their normal locations.

b. Further indications of rail shipments from Austria to Hungary suggest that the Soviets may be transferring a chemical equipment depot to Hungary; there was previous evidence of the probable move of an army supply depot from Austria to Hungary. A new Soviet depot in the Budapest area is reported to be receiving ordnance equipment, possibly from Austria. Unusual numbers of Soviet vehicles have been observed in Budapest recently and shipments of office and household furniture from Austria have been noted. It thus appears that the Soviets are moving some personnel and materiel from Austria to Hungary but the full extent of this movement and the reasons for it are not known. The movement may represent the transfer of a portion of the Central Group of Forces Headquarters from Austria to Hungary, a move of depots for closer support of Soviet troops in Hungary (heretofore supplied from depots in Austria) or preparation for increased shipments of equipment to the Hungarian Army. There is no information that this movement has been accompanied by the arrival of equipment from the U.S.S.R. or Rumania.

c. With the expected completion of present airfield construction in Eastern Europe by 1 October, there will be a total of 40 airfields in Eastern Europe with 6,000 foot runways capable of handling jet aircraft. Some of the airfields in Germany will also be suitable for operations of long-range bombers (TU-4's), and there have been some suggestions that the Soviets intend to station new twin-jet bombers at some of the fields in Germany. Reliable observations in Hungary now show a total of 13 sweptback wing jet fighters (MIG-15's) and one jet trainer at two airfields, and there are strong indications of a jet training program in Hungary. These developments indicate the beginning of a re-equipment program of Soviet air units in Hungary.

d. Fragmentary reports continue to suggest an increase in stockpiles of petroleum products in Europe, but there is no firm evidence of the extent. There is further evidence of unusual conservation of gasoline in the Soviet Zone of Germany, of filling of underground tanks and of repair of depots and other preparations for additional storage. There is as yet no confirmation of the previously reported large movements of

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East German tank cars to the U.S.S.R. and Rumania. Information from Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria indicates preparation of additional storage facilities or movements of tank cars in apparently unusual numbers.

e. Although there have been few indications of recent significant troop activity in Rumania or Bulgaria, [] generally have continued to report increased arrivals of Soviet equipment, including tanks, in those countries during the past few months. It is believed that substantial amounts of Soviet equipment have arrived in Bulgaria during recent months, and the shipment of large amounts of medical supplies from the U.S.S.R. has also been reported. Recent shipping tonnages to Albania have been approximately seven times the normal monthly rate, but only fragmentary information is available on cargo items. Known shipments have included grains, vehicles, railroad equipment, machinery, small arms and ammunition, and petroleum products. Information is insufficient to indicate whether these increased shipments are intended primarily for military purposes or for an improvement of Albania's impoverished economy.

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f. [] Soviet Black Sea maneuvers are now scheduled for 5 - 12 September. Previous reports [] indicated that these naval maneuvers would be accompanied by large scale ground maneuvers in Eastern Europe.

g. The U.S.S.R. has continued its moves to conciliate Iran, with an offer to form a mixed commission to settle border disputes. An unconfirmed report of the terms of a Soviet trade offer also suggests that the U.S.S.R. is particularly seeking to influence the Iranian border provinces; the Soviets are said to desire a monopoly on purchases of agricultural products from these provinces and the right to station trade representatives in them. Further rumors of impending Kurdish uprisings in the Near East are not supported by reliable information.

h. From the foregoing, it is concluded that:

- (1) There are no conclusive indications of imminent Soviet hostilities in Western Europe, the Balkans or the Near East.
- (2) There are continuing indications of increasing Soviet military preparations in these areas, particularly of supply facilities and logistical build-up.
- (3) An attack in any of these areas could occur without additional warning.

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John Weckerling
JOHN WECKERLING
Brigadier General, GSC
Chairman, Joint Intelligence
Indications Committee

Present:

Colonel Vance, USAF (JIG)
Colonel Hummel, USMC (ONI)
Colonel Wackwitz, USAF (D/I-USAF)
Colonel Blair, USAF (D/I-USAF)
Colonel Adams, G-2
Colonel Baker, G-2
Colonel Duff, G-2
Colonel Smith, G-2
Colonel Wells, G-2
Lt Colonel Merrill, G-2
Major Burn, G-2
Mr Strong, State Department
[redacted] CIA
Mr McKee, G-2
Miss Grabo, G-2 (Secretary)

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